The concept of causation clearly plays a central role in all scientific endeavors. For example, Schmidt (1992) stated, "Theories are causal explanations. The goal in every science is explanation, and explanation is always causal" (p. 1177). In a similar vein, Okasha (2002) stated in his introduction to the philosophy of science that many philosophers believe that the key to understanding scientific explanation lies in the concept of causality, or as stated by Pearl (2009) , "The possibility of learning causal relationships from raw data has been on philosophers' dream lists since the time of Hume (1711-1776)" (p. 41). Not surprisingly, scientists as well as philosophers have appreciated the importance of causality, as exemplified by Einstein's statement, "Development of Western science is based on two great achievements, the invention of the formal logical system (in Euclidean geometry) by the Greek philosophers, and the discovery of the possibility to find out causal relationship by systematic experiment (Renaissance)" (cited in Boorstin, 1994, p. 3) .
Many psychologists might interpret Einstein's quote as suggesting that the problem of causality was settled long ago. Causal inference might seem to be as simple as experimental manipulation combined with random assignment to condition. If things were indeed this simple, the need for a special section devoted to causality would be unclear. However, in reality, causal inference is rarely this simple. Even if a manipulation causes an effect, Donald Campbell's work (together with the work of numerous colleagues) emphasizes that many aspects of such a causal effect are likely to remain unanswered. For example, under what conditions does the manipulation have this effect? What aspect of the manipulation is responsible for the effect? What is the mechanism whereby the manipulation has an effect?
Yet, other complications arise in many experiments. For example, what happens if some participants do not comply with their assigned condition? Or what if some individuals drop out of the study before data are fully collected? Even in the most perfectly designed experiment, problems beyond the experimenter's control may complicate the ability to make a causal inference. Of course, in some situations experimental manipulation is impractical or even unethical in the first place, requiring the use of nonexperimental approaches. Many psychologists may be unaware that methodologists in various disciplines have been hard at work devising methods for improving causal inference when experiments are "broken" or when experiments are infeasible. For example, Allison (2009) stated, "For many years, the most challenging project in statistics has been the effort to devise methods for making valid causal inferences from nonexperimental data" (p. 1).
The two target articles and three commentaries in this special section address various aspects of the role of causality. The focal points throughout are two innovative models of causality, one developed by Donald Campbell and the other developed by Donald Rubin. Most psychologists are likely to be at least somewhat familiar with Campbell's contributions to assessing the validity of empirical studies in psychology. Although Rubin's causal model was first described in an American Psychological Association journal and it is widely used not only in statistics but also in economics, medicine, and public health, his model is much less well known in psychology, perhaps because of the historical dominance of Campbell's work. Thus, one purpose of this special section is to provide psychologists with a better understanding of Rubin's model. However, the ultimate goal of the special section goes beyond this, by offering a comparison of Campbell's and Rubin's conceptualizations. In particular, the hope is that such a comparison can enrich readers' understanding of both perspectives. Shadish (2010) points out that despite the importance of Campbell's and Rubin's views on causality, the literature contains few attempts to compare and contrast their work. Shadish views the two approaches as quite different but largely complementary, differing from one another primarily in terms of bandwidth and fidelity. His specific contribution is to show how Rubin's developments can be used to improve Campbell's approach in particular and causal inference in psychology more generally. He concludes that Rubin's model "has made a great deal of progress on some of the central problems that CCM [Campbell's causal model] identified but never really solved" (Shadish, 2010, p. 14) . West and Thoemmes (2010) point out that both Campbell's and Rubin's perspectives have basic philosophical underpinnings in Hume's counterfactual model. However, Campbell focuses primarily on identifying potential threats to validity, whereas Rubin focuses on a precise definition of the causal effect accompanied by methods to estimate the magnitude of the effect. West and Thoemmes compare the two perspectives as applied to randomized experiments, "broken" randomized experiments, and observational studies. Their article shows that mutual consideration of both approaches can strengthen causal inference in psychological research.
Three commentaries accompany the two target articles. Rubin (2010) provides interesting historical comments and clarifies some of the more technical parts of his model. He agrees with Shadish (2010) and West and Thoemmes (2010) that his conceptualization is more complementary than competitive with Campbell's but also argues that Bayesian methods are ultimately necessary to address the real reason researchers conduct studies, namely to learn about which interventions should be applied in the future. Imbens (2010) agrees that the goals of the two approaches are very similar but maintains that researchers in different fields make different choices on the basis of constraints and tradition. He describes which parts of each approach have been widely incorporated into economics as well as how economics has extended various aspects of each approach. He also discusses a recent debate in economics regarding the relative importance of internal and external validity. Cook and Steiner (2010) acknowledge the many similarities between the two approaches but also identify three differences in written emphasis: (a) Campbell places greater emphasis than Rubin on the special role of pretest measures, (b) Campbell is more concerned than Rubin with unreliability in the covariates, and (c) Rubin emphasizes the advantages of using propensity scores instead of regression methods to analyze the data. Cook and Steiner then empirically assess the relative influence each of these three factors plays in reducing bias in estimating causal effects in quasiexperimental designs.
It is clear that both Campbell and Rubin have succeeded in stimulating other methodologists to think about the many complexities of causal inference. The articles in this special section reflect many of the fascinating debates inherent in this work. Equally important, however, is the fact that both perspectives also have clear practical implications for designing studies and analyzing data. As such, this special section should appeal not only to methodologists but also to a wider audience of readers who are interested in any aspect of causal inference.
